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Pension system and labor market reforms are widely debated issues
in all industrialized countries and especially in Europe; actual economic
and demographic trends indeed, urge politicians to revise Social Security
System setup. A preminent role in particular, is played by employment
protection regulation and by mandatory retirement age; this is the case for
the potential consequences on the functioning of the whole economy of any
change over these two aspects of the welfare state. Present paper considers
the political economy of such social policies jointly focusing on the eﬀects
on total employment turnover that derive either by temporary, selective
exits due to the dynamic of the labor market or by permanent, non-
selective exits due to retirements. The degree of employment protection
and the mandatory retirement age emerge in this setting, as a result of
a political process that involves three social groups: young, high and low
productivity old; the productivity gap that distinguish diﬀerent workers
is the crucial variable that drives social consensus towards a speciﬁcs e t u p
of the Social Security System.
1I n t r o d u c t i o n
Pension system and labor market reforms are widely debated issues in all in-
dustrialized countries and specially in Europe; the demographic trend and the
recent slowdown of economic growth in the EU indeed, urge politicians to revise
the structure of Social Security System. The relevance of these issues is further
enhanced by the fact that any change in the status quo is likely to aﬀect heavily
the functioning of the whole economy and the welfare of large sections of the
population.
A prominent role in this debate is played by employment protection regu-
lation and by mandatory retirement age. Indeed a reform of the labor market
involving a reduction in employment protection is considered an important tool
to promote economic growth; an increase in retirement age moreover, is a key
element to guarantee the viability of the pension system in the long run.
Present work focus on the political economy of such social policies jointly and
considers the interaction between the choice over the protection of employees in
the labor market and over retirement age.
1The approach is twofold: ﬁrst a theoretical model is built to analyze the
determinants of social consensus over diﬀerent setups of the Social Security
System; the second step is to test some hypothesis and results of the model
through the use of microdata.
The analysis considers Social Security from a wide point of view and in-
cludes in the picture mutual connections between labor market regulation and
the structure of the pension system; this allows to look more accurately at the
reasons why some institutional setups obtain enough support and are imple-
mented while other don’t.
What turns out to be crucial in this setting is total turnover on the labor
market that is driven by two main factors: temporary exits due to workers
selection at the ﬁrm level and permanent non-selective exits due to retirement;
the confrontation in the political system of insiders and outsiders of the labor
market results into diﬀerent combinations of these two elements.
In particular the old generation representing the insiders supports high de-
grees of employment protection; this is especially true for low-skill old workers
that are aﬀected in the ﬁrst instance by any selection process.
On the other side of the labor market, though, high employment protection
limits the access of the young generation that looks for jobs; therefore, a social
conﬂict arises mainly determined by the quest for employment.
The pension system in this scenario represents for young workers, a useful
tool to increase outsiders’ entries into the labor market through mandatory re-
tirement; old workers instead, might consider retirement as an insurance device
to limit income uncertainty, if employment protection decreases.
In the end, both the degree of employment protection and the mandatory
retirement age result from a political process involving three social groups: the
young, low-skill and high-skill old; two main setups get enough consensus and
are implemented: a ﬁrst one where employment protection is high and old
workers retire early, and a second where instead there is low protection and late
retirement.
The main elements driving the result of the political process are two: the
productivity gap between high and low productivity workers and the size of the
pension paid to retired workers; when productivity diﬀers a lot among workers
the ﬁrst outcome is more easily observed. On the other hand high levels of the
replacement rate tend to favor the second setup for the Social Security System.
2 Related Literature
A number of papers have studied the relationship between public pension and
other aspects of the Social Security System in a political economy framework.
Conde-Ruiz and Galasso (2002) for instance, analyze the links between pub-
lic pension and retirement age; they ﬁnd that in equilibrium, the political sup-
port for a large Social Security System relies on elderly with incomplete working
history and low-ability young that expect to retire early.
2In Galasso and Conde-Ruiz (2001) instead, pension and redistribution sys-
tems are considered jointly; in equilibrium a welfare state characterized by gen-
erous public pensions and a high level of income redistribution is sustained by a
coalition composed by elderly and low-income young. Similar results are found
also in Lambertini and Azariadis (1998) where unskilled workers and retirees
form the winning coalition.
Another strain of literature did consider mutual interactions between labor
market and the setup of the Social Security System.
Boeri, Conde Ruiz and Galasso (2003) focus on the protection against labor
market risks considering in particular, the trade-oﬀ between employment pro-
tection legislation and unemployment beneﬁts; they show that two main out-
comes emerge from the political process. The ﬁrst one is characterized by low
unemployment beneﬁts and high employment protection and arises if low-skill
insiders are a majority; the second one instead, includes high unemployment
beneﬁts and low employment protection.
Recently, Brugiavini, Conde Ruiz and Galasso (2003) built a model that
includes also transfers from parents to kids; the tax rate ﬁnancing the Social
Security System, in this setting, depends on the number of unemployed workers
in the economy.
When the unemployment rate is high a large number of old parents are
recipient of the welfare state; on the other hand kids are less likely to ﬁnd a job
and must rely heavily on the transfers they receive from their parents. Thus a
coalition between old recipient of the welfare state and non-emancipated kids
supports a large Social Security System; the opposite happens when instead
unemployment rate is low.
Present work contributes to this debate considering employment protection
legislation and retirement age as the outcomes of a unique political process; other
papers analyzed such aspects of the Social Security System, but not jointly.
The main assumptions about agents’ behavior introduced in the paper more-
over, are tested using microdata; the dataset used for the econometrics includes
the informations collected in two diﬀerent surveys by Fondazione Rodolfo De
Benedetti on the themes of pension system and labor market reforms.
The empirical section of this work follows mainly the approach of Brugiavini,
Conde Ruiz and Galasso (2003) and of Boeri, Borsch-Supan and Tabellini (2001,
2002) that used the same survey on the pension system.
The paper is organized as follows: section 2 describes the model, section 3
deﬁnes the political equilibrium and section 4 includes the empirical analysis.
The last section concludes.
3 The Model
3.1 The Economy
Consider an economy where each agent lives for two periods and is young in the
ﬁrst and old in the second; both old and young workers are present at the same
3time on the labor market.
There is no population growth and each generation counts the same number
of individuals; the size of one cohort is normalized to one.
Agents diﬀer for their labor productivity: in each generation, half are high
productivity workers and half are low productivity. At time t old individuals’
type is common knowledge; the productivity of the young instead, is observed
only when they start looking for a job on the labor market.
Agents can be classiﬁed initially, in three diﬀerent groups according to their
age and to their productivity: high productivity old (HP), low productivity old
(LP) and young workers (Y ).
Utility is a function ν (ct,c t+1) of present, ct, and future consumption, ct+1;






2 is the intertemporal discount factor.
There are no saving means and output is not storable; as a consequence all
that is produced within a period is also consumed; each representative agent
thus, face a budget constraint equal to his labor income.
Notice that utility is inﬂuenced exclusively by own consumption; both intra-
generational (between high and low productivity old) and inter-generational
(between old and young workers) altruism are absent.
One representative ﬁrm produces a unique good that is also the numeraire;
the market for it is competitive and any quantity can be sold at the equilibrium
price.








t is the number of high productivity agents and LLP
t is the number
of low productivity agents employed at time t; the parameters a ∈ [1,2] and
α ∈ [0,1] describe respectively the productivity gap between the two types of
workers and the technology in use.
Since young agents reveal their type by entering in the labor market, the
representative ﬁrm can sort high and low productivity individuals. Diﬀerent
workers though, are perfect substitutes; the only diﬀerence among them is labor
endowment: 1 for LP agents and a for HP agents.
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Except for these constraints, labor market is competitive; therefore it is
possible to consider a unique market where unit of eﬃcient labor are exchanged
and where each of this unit cannot be paid less than W
¯
LP.
The representative ﬁrm chooses the quantity of labor, xt that maximizes its
proﬁts Πt,d e ﬁned as:
Πt = Yt − WLP
t · xt
Despite the fact that one unit of labor has the same price no matter if the
supplier is a high or a low productivity worker, the ﬁrm hires high productivity
workers ﬁrst; this is the case for instance, because they can improve the technol-
ogy in use through the introduction of more eﬀective routines in the productive
process1.
All agents have no disutility from working and labor supply is perfectly rigid
for any positive wage.
Old agents supply work on the labor market for a fraction 1+θ
2 of the unitar-
ian period and retire in the last fraction 1−θ
2 of it; the young generation instead,
remains on the labor market for the whole period.
Unemployed workers do not receive any beneﬁts and simply get nothing if
they do not work.
The Social Security System awards to each retired old a fraction p ∈ [0,1] of
his last wage. Pensions are ﬁnanced via a lump sum tax over labor income; the
tax rate, τt, must guarantee a balanced budget.
3.2 Timing and Structure of the Game
The unitary period is divided into 2 sub-periods of the same size; there are four
stages in the game, two for each subperiod.
The following sections describe both the subperiods and the subgames.
3.2.1 First Sub-period
At time 0 the ﬁrst stage begins and the political process takes place; the degree
of protection of insider workers, η, and the mandatory retirement age, θ are
chosen, once and for all, after that.
The ﬁrst variable sets the fraction of low productivity workers that the rep-
resentative ﬁrm is allowed to ﬁre each period; the second one deﬁnes the fraction
of the period that an old worker will actually work before retirement.
The choice over these two dimensions of the Social Security System is dis-






After the political process, the second stage starts; the young start looking
for job and reveal their type (suppose for instance, they completed a schooling
1Representative ﬁrm preference for high productivity worker is not explicitly modeled in
this setting; a formal treatment of this issue though can be found in the appendix.
2Using continuous variables does not change the qualitative results obtained in the paper
and is completely irrelevant in the case of η.
5path that is a perfect signal of their productivity) while a stochastic displace-
ment process hits the insiders.
This causes a half of employed old workers to leave the job for reasons
that are not covered by employment protection such as: bankruptcy of the
ﬁrm, illness, need to move to other places, serious mistakes or fraud, voluntary
unemployment or maternity etc.. Since the displacement process is stochastic,
it aﬀects in the same measure high and low productivity agents.
The representative ﬁrm then, must choose the quantity, x1
0, of input to
bring in the production process to oﬀset the outﬂow due to displacement. In
hiring new workers, high productivity individuals are chosen ﬁrst; the number
of incoming workers is such that, given the composition of the pool between
high and low productivity unemployed, the quantity of labor equals x1
0.
3.2.2 Second Sub-period
In the second sub-period, at date 1
2, the third stage begins; a selection process
takes place where, according to the results of the political process, a fraction η
of low productivity workers is ﬁred.
Old and young low productivity agents are randomly chosen so that both
are ﬁred in the same proportion, η.
The representative ﬁrm then, decides the quantity of labor, x2
0,t og e tf r o m
the market to oﬀset the reduction in input due to the selection process; again
high productivity individuals are hired ﬁrst and the number of workers involved
depends on the composition of the unemployment pool.
After a fraction θ of this sub-period the old retire; at date 1+θ
2 thus, the
stock of labor employed in the production decreases again.
In the last stage of the game then, the representative ﬁrm must choose the
quantity, x3
0, of input to get from the market; the same procedure described
before deﬁnes the hiring process.
The following graph displays the timing of the model:










In the ﬁrst stage workers turn to vote and choose their preferred pair (θ,η).
The degree of employment protection and the retirement age are set in a
pure majority voting stage where electoral platforms including both the elements
characterizing the Social Security System are compared pairwise.
In this setting a strategy for agent i, Σi, is a function of his type, ξ,o f
the replacement rate, of the technology parameter and of the productivity gap
between high and low productivity workers.






Right after the political process, the representative ﬁrm chooses the quantity
x1
0;as t r a t e g yf o rt h eﬁrm Σ1
F is a function of its initial stock of labor, L−1,o f
the decrease in input due to displacement, γ1
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× [0,1] → [0,(a +1 ) ]
Notice that both L−1 and γ1
0 never exceed 1
2 (a +1 ) , i.e. total labor provided
by one generation, since at the beginning of each period only old agents are
employed.
In the third stage, the representative ﬁrm chooses x2
0;as t r a t e g y ,Σ2
F,i nt h i s
setting, is a function of previous subperiod stock of labor, L1
0, of input reduction
due to labor selection, γ2








:[ 0 ,(a +1 ) ]× [0,1] × [0,1] → [0,(a +1 ) ]
When all old workers retire, input shrinks again and the representative ﬁrm
gets from the market the quantity x3
0 of labor; its strategy Σ3
F, is a function
of the stock of input deriving from the period going from date 1
2 to date 1−θ
2 ,
7L2
0, of labor decrease due to old workers retirement, γ3
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4 Equilibrium Analysis
The game is sequential and requires backward induction to be solved; the equi-
librium analysis then, starts from the maximization problem of the representa-
tive ﬁrm.
4.1 The Problem of the Firm
A preliminary observation is worth to be stressed before proceeding with the
equilibrium analysis of the last three stages of the game: representative ﬁrm
hiring decisions, change in each period, the composition of the employment and
unemployment pools across time. This happens both with respect to agents’
type (high or low productivity) and to agent’s age (old or young agents).
As a consequence employment decisions inﬂuence also γ1
0, γ2
0 and γ3
0;n o n e t h e -
less the representative ﬁrm does not care about the composition and the size
of labor ﬂows going in and out, since there are no costs for hiring and ﬁring
workers. In order to simplify the analysis then, it is possible to consider these
quantities as exogenous parameters.
4.1.1 Retirement
At time 1+θ
2 the representative ﬁrm chooses the quantity x3
0 of labor to get



































0 is current price of one unit of eﬃcient labor, equal to its marginal
productivity and L2






Notice that future proﬁts are discounted at the same rate used in the workers’
problem.
























2 the political process has already deﬁned the fraction η of low produc-
tivity workers that the representative ﬁrm can ﬁre; this amounts for a total γ2
0
decrease in the stock of labor.




























































































At time 0 the displacement process takes place and causes a reduction in la-
bor input amounting to γ1
































0 is the current price of one unit of eﬃcient labor equal to its
marginal productivity and L1




























































From the maximization problem of the displacement stage is possible to derive,
























































Proposition 1 In equilibrium, the representative ﬁrm held constant the level
of labor input at 1
2 (a +1 )and each unit of eﬃcient labor is paid W
¯
LP. Labor
market then, is either in equilibrium or faces excess supply.
Proof. Guess that in facts, the amount of labor employed in the production
process is held constant at 1
2 (a +1 )and that every subperiod, the price for each
unit of eﬃcient labor is W
¯
LP.
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Check then, that on the labor market, there is either excess supply or equilibrium,
if an eﬃc i e n tu n i to fl a b o ri sp a i dW
¯
LP.
Notice that when all old workers retire, a complete turnover happens and
the whole young generation gets hired by the representative ﬁrm; therefore at
the beginning of every period, all the old are employed while all the young are
unemployed. Total unemployment is zero at the end of the period and amounts
to a whole generation at the beginning of the next one.







this is the case because the employment pool includes in the same proportion
high and low productivity workers. Moreover, since the representative ﬁrms




The unemployment pool includes, at that time, the whole young generation so
that the representative ﬁrm can hire only high productivity workers to ﬁll the
gap caused by displacement.
The productivity of such workers is a so that the number of people that get





. Unemployment increases at 5a−1
4a ≥ 1. The composition











When the selection process takes place, the number of low productivity work-
ers employed in the representative ﬁrm is 1
4; this means that labor input is







Also in this case there are enough high productivity individuals in the unemploy-
ment pool to ﬁll the decrease in labor input; the number of them that gets a job
is
η




11Total unemployment increases to 5a−1
4a +
η(a−1)
4a while the composition of the
pool is such that high productivity workers are
2a−1−η




In the last stage the old retire and the representative ﬁrm has an expected


















Since the representative ﬁrm is an approximation for the whole economy, many
workers are involved in the process; the law of large numbers then, guarantees
that actual and expected values of γ3
t coincide.
After that all the unemployed young are hired.
As it is required for the initial guess to be an equilibrium, labor market is
either in equilibrium or faces excess supply and the price for one unit of ef-
ﬁcient labor is ﬁxed at W
¯
LP; ﬁnally also the ﬁrst order conditions for proﬁt
maximization are fulﬁlled each subperiod.

















and the tax rate then, must be set at:
τ = p ·
1 − θ
2
4.2 The Political Process
The political process is an open agenda pure majority voting over a set of
policy alternatives; the platforms include the degree of employment protection
and retirement age. They are compared pairwise and the preferred pair (η;θ)
is implemented.
Since the electorate is a continuum, each voter has zero mass and cannot
aﬀect the result of the election. Strategic voting thus, is excluded and it is
possible to assume that each voter expresses his preferences sincerely.
Consider now the political preferences of the agents, given the equilibrium
strategy of the representative ﬁrm.
4.2.1 Political Preferences of High Productivity Old
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+λ1 · θ + λ2 (1 − θ)+µ1 · η + µ2 (1 − η)
Expected utility is the summation of three elements; each refers to a speciﬁc
working history of the agent.
The ﬁrst one describes the event in which an high productivity worker is not
displaced in the ﬁrst sub-period and works until retires.
The second element refers to the situation where the agent is displaced in
the ﬁrst sub-period, but hired after the selection process; as a consequence he
works for a fraction θ of the second sub-period and then retires.
The last one corresponds to the case where the worker is displaced in the
ﬁrst sub-period and never hired again; he gets only the pension for the fraction
(1 − θ) of the second sub-period.
4.2.2 Political Preferences of Low Productivity Old



















































+λ1 · θ + λ2 (1 − θ)+µ1 · η + µ2 (1 − η)
Again expected utility is the result of agents’ working history; a low produc-
tivity worker may face three diﬀerent situations corresponding to the elements
of the summation in the above equation.
13The ﬁrst situation corresponds to the case where he is not displaced in the
ﬁrst sub-period and further is not ﬁred in the second sub-period; the agent
works until retires.
In the second case the worker is not displaced in the ﬁrst sub-period, but is
ﬁred in the second one; as a consequence, he works only in the ﬁrst sub-period
and then is unemployed until he retires.
In the third situation initial displacement happens and the agent is never
hired again; therefore, he remains unemployed until retirement.
4.2.3 Political Preferences of the Young








































































· a · W
¯
LP (1 − τ)
¸
Notice that since saving means are absent and output is not storable, no
transfers between periods are possible; each agent relies on current income to
ﬁnance his consumption.
Expected utility in 0, UY
0 (η,θ), results from the summation of four elements.
The ﬁrst of them describes the situations where the worker happens to be a
low productivity type: he is hired only when all old agents retire and works for
af r a c t i o n
(1−θ)
2 of the whole period.
The remaining elements refer to the case where the agent is a high produc-
tivity worker; in particular the second of them describes the situation where the
agent is hired in the ﬁrst sub-period, after displacement. He works during the
whole period.
14The third one corresponds to the case where the worker is hired only at the
beginning of the second sub-period due to the selection process.
The last element is equivalent to the ﬁrst one and the worker is hired only
after retirement of old agents.
Diﬀerent wages correspond to states of the world where he is a high produc-
tivity or a low productivity type.
4.2.4 The Voting Game
This section characterizes the outcome of the political process leading to the
choice of mandatory retirement age θ, and of the degree of employment protec-
tion η.
The analysis goes through the steps reported below.
First a simpliﬁed setting where each representative agent is risk neutral and
has a linear utility function is considered; in the second step risk aversion is
introduced.
The political process with risk neutrality In this section the preferences
of each representative agent are derived under the simplifying hypothesis of risk
neutrality.
High productivity old workers Consider the problem of a risk neutral,
high productivity old worker that chooses the value of the parameters η and
























+ λ1 · θ + λ2 (1 − θ)+µ1 · η + µ2 (1 − η)
Proposition 2 High productivity old agents’ preferred solution is:
• No employment protection, η =1 , and no retirement, θ =1if 4
3· a
2a−1 ≥ p.




Proof. Consider the Kuhn-Tucker conditions for the problem of a high













+ µ1 − µ2 =0




δη ≥ 0; the optimal choice
for this type of agent then, always entails µ1 =0 , µ2 > 0,a n dη =1 .



































+λ1 − λ2 =0

































+λ1 − λ2 =0
















It is the case then, that the equation deﬁning high productivity old workers
utility has a unique point of minimum for a value of θ such that
δUHP
0
δθ |η=1 =0 ;
this means further that optimal choice for this type of agent is either θ =0or
θ =1 . In order to see which one is the solution for the maximization problem
consider when is UHP
0 (1,1) − UHP






























therefore high productivity old workers choose θ =1if 4
3 · a
2a−1 ≥ p and
θ =0if 1 ≥ p>4
3 · a
2a−1.
Low productivity old workers The maximization problem faced by a

















+λ1 · θ + λ2 (1 − θ)+µ1 · η + µ2 (1 − η)
16Proposition 3 Low productivity old agents’ preferred solution is:
• Complete employment protection, η =0 , and no retirement, θ =1if
2
3 ≥ p.
• Complete employment protection, η =0 , and early retirement, θ =0if
1 ≥ p>2
3.
Proof. Consider the K - T conditions for the maximization problem of this











θ · η + µ1 − µ2 =0
η =0 , µ1 > 0 and µ2 =0is always the preferred solution for low productivity
old workers.
























Check now for an internal solution where λ1 = λ2 =0 ; substituting for η =0














· p ≥ 0
moreover there is only one point of minimum for LP workers’ utility function
corresponding to the value of θ reported above.
The optimal choice for this kind of agents thus, is either θ =1or θ =0 ;i n
particular it is optimal for low productivity old workers to choose no retirement
when is ULP
0 (0,1) − UHP

























therefore low productivity old workers choose θ =1if 2
3 ≥ p and θ =0if
1 ≥ p>2
3.






























+λ1 · θ + λ2 (1 − θ)+µ1 · η + µ2 (1 − η)
Proposition 4 Young agents’ preferred solution is:



















+ µ1 − µ2 =0
The left hand side of the previous equation is always positive for a>1;t h e
optimal choice for this type of agent then is η =1 .














+λ1 − λ2 =0
The above quantity is either positive or negative and its sign depends upon
the agent’s choice on η and on the value of the parameters; therefore a solution
for the maximization problem always entails a corner solution for θ.I np a r t i c u l a r






(2a − 1)(a +1 )
and θ =0when instead, this is not the case.
Voting game equilibrium The set-up that emerge from the political
process is characterized by no employment protection; the choice over θ depends
upon the level of the replacement rate.
Proposition 5 If a>1 then:
• η∗ =1, θ









18• η∗ =1, θ










Proof. In this case there is always a majority of voters that sustains the
introduction of η =1 ; both high productivity old and young workers indeed,
prefer no employment protection, no matter what the equilibrium value of θ is.









as it is clear from the description of the preferences of these type of agents.
When instead, the replacement rate lies outside the above interval a majority
sustaining θ =0forms that includes low productivity old workers and either
young agents (if p ≤ 2
3
2a2
(2a−1)(a+1)) or high productivity old (if p>4
3 · a
2a−1); this















so that optimal choice for old low productivity workers is to retire at the
beginning of the second sub-period.
The political process with risk aversion Introducing risk aversion makes
the analysis much more complicated; agents’ maximization problems indeed, are
not easily solved analytically. Nonetheless assuming that workers’ preferences
are logarithmic in income permits to get some results.
In order to study this problem, it is useful to go through two steps: in the
ﬁrst one the Kuhn-Tucker conditions are derived for each agent type, in the
second one the main outcomes of the analysis are derived.
Consider ﬁrst the case of high productivity workers.
High productivity old workers The maximization problem of these










































log[p(1 − θ)] +
+λ1 · θ + λ2 (1 − θ)+µ1 · η + µ2 (1 − η)
















+ µ1 − µ2 =0
so that µ1 =0 , µ2 ≥ 0 and η =1is a solution for the maximization problem.




1 − p(1 − θ)
1+θ +
p










2 (3 − 2θ)
θ +
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+λ1 − λ2 =0




1 − p(1 − θ)
1+θ +
p










2 (3 − 2θ)
θ +
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+λ1 − λ2 =0
The above equation cannot be solved for θ and it is not possible to derive
the optimal choice with respect to retirement age for this type of agents; notice
though that it can never be the case that θ =1is an optimal choice for these
agents since UHP
0 |θ=η=1 = −∞






, (0,1) and (1,1) represent an optimal choice for high pro-
ductivity workers.
Look now at the situation where these agents choose no employment protec-



































The above inequality holds only for some values of the parameters a and p;

































Therefore for every value of p ∈ [0,1] it is possible to ﬁnd a value of the







0 (1,0) < 0.




























0 (1,0) ≥ 0.
20Low productivity old workers The maximization problem faced by a
































log[p(1 − θ)] +
+λ1 · θ + λ2 (1 − θ)+µ1 · η + µ2 (1 − η)










2 (1 − θ)
1+
p
2 (1 − θ)
¸
+ µ1 − µ2 =0
Since marginal utility of η is always negative a solution for the maximization
problem requires that µ1 ≥ 0, µ2 =0and η =0 .
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+ λ1 − λ2 =0
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1+θ +
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+ λ1 − λ2 =0
since p ≤ 1it is the case that λ1 ≥ 0, λ2 =0and θ =0 .
Old low productivity workers prefer then, complete employment protection
and early retirement.
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+λ1 · θ + λ2 (1 − θ)+µ1 · η + µ2 (1 − η)










































2 (1 − θ)
1+
p
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+
+µ1 − µ2 =0






































1 − p(1 − θ)
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2 (1 − θ)
¸
+λ1 − λ2 =0
No analytical solution is possible for the system of equations deﬁning young
agents’ preferences over the set-up for the Social Security System; also for these
agents though, it is possible to exclude that θ =1is an optimal choice since
UY
0 |θ=1 = −∞.
Nonetheless there are two things that are worth to be noticed with respect
to the optimal choice of young workers over employment protection.






δη =0the optimal choice for this type of agents entails a
corner solution, i.e. is either η =0or η =1 .
22The second one is reported in the proposition that follows:
Proposition 6 If retirement age is set at θ =0 , young agents preferred choice
with respect to employment protection is η =0 .
Proof. Consider the K-T condition with respect to employment protection
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Since is a(0) = 1,a n da>1,i ti st h ec a s et h a t∂UY
δη approaches zero from
below as retirement age gets closer to the beginning of the second subperiod; it is
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23reasonable to assume then, that when θ =0preferred choice of young workers
is η =0
As a consequence these agents prefer the platform (0,0) to (1,0).





and (0,0); notice that complete






































; indeed young work-
ers preferences are such that the platform including complete employment pro-





and (1,0) so that when
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(0,0) is the optimal choice for young agents.
If instead, it is the case that:
UY































No employment protection and late retirement then is young agents’ pre-
ferred setup for the Social Security System.
Analyze now the conditions that drive the choice of young workers and in
particular look at the following inequality:
UY


























































24Consider the role played by the productivity gap in the deﬁnition of the out-











































Moreover for every p ∈ [0,1] it is always possible to ﬁnd a productivity gap wide
enough that the pair (0,0) is preferred over the alternative; indeed the limit for




































Solve now the previous inequality for a∗ such that for every a ≥ a∗ (θ) is
UY























































































































A further observation is relative to the replacement rate p;i ti st h ec a s et h a t
for high levels of p there are no values a>1 such that:
UY








T os e ew h yt h i si st h ec a s ec o n s i d e rt h a ti fa =1and p =1is :
∙
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25Voting game equilibrium Two main set-ups emerge from the political
process: one where there is complete employment protection (ηt =0 )a n de a r l y
retirement (θt =0 ), and one where instead there is no employment protection
and late retirement (ηt =1 , θt = 1
2). The variables that drive agents’ choice are
the productivity gap and the replacement rate.
Proposition 7 The political process has two possible outcomes namely:






is a Condorcet winner for the voting game if 1 <a≤
a∗
Proof. Consider ﬁrst that no majority can sustain a platform that includes
no retirement; for all agents indeed, expected utility approaches −∞ as θ ap-
proaches 1.





is never preferred to (0,0).
When there is complete employment protection every diﬀerence among old
workers disappears and both have the same preferences; given that if η =0 , is
δ0ULP
0
δθ |η=0 ≤ 0, these agents prefer (0,0). Also for young workers moreover, this
platform represent an optimal choice.
Therefore all agents choose complete employment protection and early re-






The platform (1,0) never gets a majority versus (0,0); being low productivity
old workers preferred solution, the platform (0,0) is always sustained by this type
of agents; moreover since it is the case that a>1 and limθ→0 a(θ)=1also
young workers prefer (0,0) to (1,0).





;n o t i c e
that if complete employment protection and early retirement is preferred to no
employment protection and late retirement, then (0,0) is a Condorcet winner
for the voting game.
Low productivity old workers always choose the platform (0,0) since:
ULP


















The choice of high productivity old and young workers instead depends upon
the values of the parameters deﬁning the productivity gap and the replacement

























































































The above equalities imply that whenever the platform (0,0) is chosen by high































Young agents then are pivotal in the voting process.
From the analysis of the preferences of these agents emerges that for every
level of p ∈ [0,1] there is a value of the productivity gap a∗ such that for every
a ≥ a∗ is UY






. Therefore the platform (0,0) is a Condorcet
winner for the voting game if the previous condition is fulﬁlled.
Notice now that if instead a<a ∗ and UY
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; the platform including no employment protection and






Condorcet winner of the voting game.
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; furthermore also the plat-















0 (1,0) = UHP







Being preferred to all other alternatives, no employment protection and late
retirement is the outcome of the political process and a Condorcet winner in the
voting game.
5 Empirical Analysis
The model presented in the previous section provides a description of the reasons
why a speciﬁc Social Security System setup is chosen and consequently may be
diﬃcult to reform; it gives also some inside on the diﬀerent social groups that
support its implementation.
The simple insider-outsider framework adopted, describes the behavior of
each type of agent; the ﬁnal results of the analysis rely heavily on such prefer-
ences so that it seems useful to test wether or not they give a correct represen-
tation of what happens in a real economy.
Present section tries to answer this question using microdata; the empirical
evidence comes from two surveys conducted in Italy and in Germany that focus
on citizens opinions over diﬀerent reforms of the welfare state.
27Unfortunately the questionnaires were not tailored on the particular pur-
poses of current analysis and do not directly address the speciﬁci s s u e sc o n -
sidered. Informations then, must be gathered from the attitude of interviewed
persons over slightly diﬀerent arguments.
Three main aspects of the model have been tested and namely:
1. The existence of altruism among diﬀerent generations.
2. Agents preferences toward retirement age.
3. Agents preferences toward diﬀerent degrees of employment protection.
5.1 Data Description
Fondazione Rodolfo De Benedetti provided data sets reporting the results of
two surveys on pension system and labor market reforms.
In particular, one data set included 1000 records from a questionnaire about
two possible scenarios for a reformed labor market; the observations are the
results of a survey conducted in Italy in the year 2000 on a representative
sample of the population aged 14-80. The questionnaire was administrated
to the interviewed persons directly at home.
This information has been used to characterize workers’ actual preferences
over employment protection.
A second dataset reports the informations gathered from a survey about
pensions conducted in Germany (2500 records) and Italy (2000 records) in the
year 2001.
A particular issue arises with respect to the interviews collected between
September and October 2001 in Italy; some of them happened to be recorded
in the very same day or immediately after the terrorist attack of New York.
Due to that 480 individuals were contacted again and asked the same questions;
an additional 500 people moreover, were added to the survey in order to have
observations not compromised by the above mentioned event.
The whole database including the 500 new records has been used by Boeri
et al. (2002); the analysis that follows instead, relies on the original data set
including 2000 observations. In order to account for the bias in people attitude
deriving from the terrorist attacks, a dummy variable with value zero for the
interviews recorded before September 11th 2001, has been used in the regres-
sions.
Interviews were carried out through a Computer Assisted Telephone Inter-
view (CATI) technique on a representative sample of the population aged 16-80;
the questionnaire was part of a wider omnibus survey.
These data allowed to disentangle the eﬀects of personal characteristics of the
i n t e r v i e w e dp e r s o ni nd e t e r m i n i n gt h es u p p o r tt od i ﬀerent setups of the pension
system; in particular the analysis focus on the eﬀects of age and education on
intergenerational altruism and on preferences over retirement age.
285.2 Methodology
A ﬁrst methodological issue is posed by the selection of the questions included
in the survey; the main criterium is obviously the bearing on the subject at a
stake. A second less obvious criterium prescribes to choose questions that do
not involve variations in the quantities that in the model are exogenously set
(as for instance, the replacement rate paid by the pension system).
Diﬀerent methodologies have been used in the empirical analysis; each of the
above mentioned issues, indeed, required a speciﬁc treatment of the data from
the surveys.
The test for the existence of intergenerational altruism requires only descrip-
tive statistics; probit and ordered probit estimation techniques instead, have
been used to study the preference over employment protection and retirement
age.
Socio-economics variables such as sex, geographic provenience, family size,
marital and professional status were used in all estimations.
Available informations about family income moreover were included among
the regressors when data from the labor market survey are considered; the
estimations based on the pension survey ﬁnally, used also some variables about
the respondent status with respect to the person with the highest contribution
to familiar income, about the respondent opinion over the social security system
and her political orientation.
Non respondents raise in this framework a methodological issue due to the
self-selection bias aﬀecting the sample; in order to cope with this problem the
following approach has been adopted.
Records that are lacking some informations on both personal characteristics
of the interviewed person and her opinion over the Social Security System are
expunged from the sample. Instead a proﬁle of those people that simply refused
to answer the speciﬁc question at a stake is reported at the beginning of each
regression; in this way it is possible to describe the causes of self-selection.
The same procedure obviously, cannot be adopted for those records where
personal characteristics of the respondent are missing; in this case the bias in
the sample remains unexplained mainly due to lack of information.
A second problem posed by non respondents involves the trade-oﬀ between
robustness of the results and the size of the self-selection bias; expanding the
set of regressors indeed, helps to test the robustness of the relevant variables
but requires, at the same time, to expunge a larger number of records from
the sample. This is especially true when the regressors include some sensible
characteristics of the interviewed person as for instance, income level or political
orientation.
In order to control for this problem two rounds of estimations have been con-
ducted; in the ﬁrst one only personal characteristics of the respondent that are
recorded in both surveys were used as regressors; this represents the minimum
set of independent variables. In the second round instead, regressors varied
across diﬀerent estimations and included all the informations available for each
survey.
29A posterior check revealed no signiﬁcant discrepancies among the two rounds;
the results reported in the following section then are those obtained using the
largest set of variables.
5.3 Results
5.3.1 Altruism
In the model social groups and individual agents are completely selﬁsh; in other
words there is no intergenerational nor intragenerational altruism. This obvi-
ously aﬀects signiﬁcantly the political process.
Unfortunately no questions could be found providing informations on in-
tragenerational altruism; thus the analysis is limited to the existence of some
preference for redistribution among diﬀerent generations.
The test over this issue relies on the following questions, included in the
survey on the pension system:
• Would you be willing to shoulder during a transition period of 10 years
higher contributions to the pension system if this were to prevent that
your children and grandchildren must pay even higher contributions?
• How much of a higher contribution rate?
1) yes, up to 1 percent points;
2) yes, up to 3 percent points;
3) yes, up to 5 percent points;
4) yes, up to 10 percent points;
5) no, not at all;
Both ﬁt pretty well to the aim of the analysis and allow to verify directly
the presence of intergenerational altruism.
The pool of the respondent included individuals with diﬀerent characteristics
depending on the country where the interview was conducted.
In particular the ﬁrst question was asked to all currently employed in Italy;
in Germany instead currently employed that were also self employed or employee
in familiar enterprises, and the civil servants were excluded from the respondents
pool. These two sets jointly amount to a 45.2% of the whole sample.
The Italian survey moreover, did not use the ﬁrst question as a ﬁlter for the
second one while in Germany this was the case; therefore only people declaring
to be willing to pay higher contributions during the transition period were also
a s k e da b o u tt h es i z eo ft h ei n c r e a s e .
Consider now the evidence derived from the ﬁrst question.
Non respondents amount to less than 1% of the total; the self-selection
bias thus, is very limited. These people are both males and females, mainly
middle-aged (between 35 and 54 years old), from Germany (especially western
Germans), non-single, employed as white collars, informed over the pension
30reform issues and fearing a future crisis of the pension system; all of them
moreover were interviewed after September 11th. Since such individuals are
those potentially more hurt by this kind of reform, it may be the case that self-
selection bias derive from the fact that the question was perceived as disturbing.
A majority of the interviewed refused to bear the costs of a transition pe-
riod that could alleviate the costs for the next generations; the following table
displays the results of the survey:
Table 1: Intergenerational Altruism
   % Total % Valid
No  57.53% 57.83% 
Yes  41.95% 42.17% 
No Answer  0.53%    
   100.00% 100.00%
 
Source: Author’s calculation based on German-Italian survey
This outcome represents a ﬁrst evidence that altruism between members of
diﬀerent generations is in facts, quite weak.
A further conﬁrm comes from the second question.
Since the German survey used the answer to the previous question as a ﬁlter
for the next one while the Italian did not, the observations are not homoge-
neous between countries; a problem arises then on how to deﬁne the degree of
intergenerational altruism.
The ﬁrst step of the analysis showed that intergenerational altruism is shared
only by a minority of the population, therefore it seems interesting to limit
the analysis of the second question to these people; in this way it is possible
to assess more accurately how strong are the preferences for intergenerational
redistribution of the ”altruists”.
The pool of potential respondent amounts only to 19% of the sample while
non respondent are a negligible fraction.
Also in this case the interviewed people show a low degree of intergenera-
tional altruism; looking at the descriptive statistics reveals that those willing to
increase their contributions of more than a 3% represent slightly more than 1/3
of the respondents (see table 2).
31Table 2: Degree of Intergenerational Altruism
   % Total 
% 
Cumulate 




0  5.23% 5.23% 5.24% 5.24% 
1  22.79% 28.02% 22.86% 28.11% 
2  36.40% 64.43% 36.51% 64.61% 
3  26.38% 90.81% 26.46% 91.07% 
4  8.90% 99.71% 8.93% 100.00% 
No 
Answer  0.29% 100.00% --    
 
Source: Author’s calculation based on German-Italian survey
This result is obviously reinforced when the methodology adopted in the
Italian survey is used and those among the Germans that refused to shoulder
the transition burden are included in the ﬁrst class of table 2 (labeled ”0”); in
this case people that are willing to pay higher contributions in excess of 3% fall
to about 17% of the respondents set.
The assumption of substantial egoism of each generation then, is not too far
from what is observed in the data.
5.3.2 Preference towards retirement age
Consider now agents preferences toward retirement age.
One question included in the survey over pension system addresses directly
the issue and asks what follows:
• A possibility to stabilize future contribution rates is an increase in the
retirement age. Would you accept an increase in the retirement age if this
would mean that the future contributions to public pensions could remain
constant?
1) yes, 1 years later;
2) yes, 2 years later;
3) yes, 3 years later;
4) yes, up to 5 years later;
5) yes, even if more than 5 years later;
6) no;
The set of people interviewed over this issue is slightly diﬀerent in the two
surveys; in particular while in Germany all employed in the private sector that
32are not self-employed are included, in Italy the respondents are all currently
employed, no matter in which sector nor if self-employed.
Respondents amount to 30.84% of total sample; a negligible fraction of them
(0.11%) did not answer the question and also in this case there is little room to
give an explanation of the self-selection bias4.
Possible answers are classiﬁed according to a scale ranging from 0 to 5 where
zero corresponds to the answer ”no” and 5 to the answer ”yes, even if more than
5 years later”; an ordered probit estimation technique is used to ﬁnd the most
important variables aﬀecting the choice over this issue.
Almost all the regressors are dummies describing the marital status (single,
couple, widow), the job (bluecollar, whitecollar) and the relationship with the
person that mostly contributes to family income (myself, sondaughter, partner,
parent).
Unionization, information about current debate on the pension system and
r e s p o n d e n t ’ so p i n i o no nt h i si s s u ea r er e p o r t e di na dh o cd u m m yv a r i a b l e s
(union, informed, crisisfear, futurereform); political orientation is measured on
a scale ranging from 0 (extreme left) to 10 (extreme right).
The place of residence is deﬁned through dummy variables as well; in par-
ticular, Italy has been divided in three areas, north, centre and south, while for
Germany only the distinction between east and west has been considered.
The variables ”age” and ”family size” are not dummies; the numbers re-
ported by the survey are used.
The regressor ”education” is classiﬁe da c c o r d i n gt oas c a l ew h e r e1i d e n t i ﬁes
the attainment of primary education or no formal education, 2 identiﬁes the
attainment of a secondary degree of education, and 3 identiﬁes people with a
university degree or a higher level of education.
T h er e s u l t so ft h ee s t i m a t ea r er e p o r t e db e l o w
4The self-selection bias is particularly limited in this case because the use of a large set of
variables required to expunge many observations due to some missing records (26.14% of the
set of potential respondent); by considering the smallest set of variable it emerges that non-
respondents are mainly middle-aged eastern Germans and count for less than 1% of potential
respondents.
33T a b l e3 :P r e f e r e n c ef o rL a t eR e t i r e m e n t
Ordered probit analysis points out that age and level of education are sta-
tistically signiﬁcant for a 5% conﬁdence interval; both aspects are relevant in
the description of agents’ choice made in the previous section (education can be
considered a proxy for labor productivity) but their eﬀects are partially at odd
with the assumption of the model.
A problem indeed, arises with respect to the variable age that is signiﬁcant
and has negative impact on people preferences toward retirement age; the model
predicts that where the Social Security System is characterized by early retire-
ment and high employment protection, as it is the case for Italy and Germany,
the young should support this set-up.
A substantial argument that can give reason of these results is found in the
paper by Boeri et al. (2002); using the same data set indeed, the authors show
that young and more educated individuals are those that mostly favor a reform
of the pension system.
This is coherent with the hypothesis that a consensus toward a change of
regime is forming in the new generations and among the most productive fraction
of the labor market; the wave of reforms introduced in recent years both in Italy
34and Germany moreover, may represent a further signal of an uprising trend in
this direction.
Not surprisingly also the variable education is highly signiﬁcant in the esti-
mation and has a positive eﬀect on individuals preferences over late retirement;
people with higher education are more likely to accept the proposal to retire later
in order to stabilize current contribution. Interpreting schooling as a proxy for
labor productivity then allows to say that high productivity and young workers
preferences converges toward an increase of mandatory retirement age.
This result is robust to diﬀerent deﬁnition of the set of independent variable;
moreover it seems to conﬁrm the hypothesis that since the establishment of
current pension system, the mismatch in the labor market has decreased thus
provoking a shifts in young agents preference from early to late retirement.
5.3.3 Preference towards employment protection
This last section considers agents preferences towards employment protection
using data from the Italian survey on labor market; a question included in it
indeed, very much ﬁts the aim of the analysis and asks what follows:
• Which of the two following labor markets do you prefer?
1) a labor market where is very diﬃcult to ﬁnd a job, but once found it is
hard to lose it;
2) a labor market where ﬁnding a job is easy, but losing it is easy too.
The dependent variable in this case is a dummy with value 1 in correspon-
dence of the ﬁrst answer and 0 otherwise.
The set of potential respondents includes the whole sample; a fraction of
about 21% of it though, did not answer the question. The self-selection problem
is relevant and requires a careful description of non-respondents.
From the descriptive statistics emerges the proﬁl eo fap e r s o ni nan o nw o r k -
ing status (mainly retired people or housewives but also students), generally
middle aged or old (more than 55 years of age), with a low level of education
and income. These people are both male and female, with a slight majority
of women, and are evenly distributed in all geographic areas; they live in fam-
ily with less than 4 members where there are no children and with the same
probability are either the main contributors to family income or not.
No records were dropped due to lack of some basic informations; the self-
selection process thus depends exclusively upon the fact that the interviewed
couldn’t answer to the question or simply refused to do that.
Given the above description of non-respondents a plausible explanations of
why some people did not answer the question is because they really did not
have an opinion on this speciﬁc issue; most of them indeed were not in the labor
market at the time of the interview and as a consequence they could feel little
concern about employment protection.
The analysis involves a probit estimation where a preference for a rigid labor
market is regressed against the main characteristics of the interviewed person;
35the set of regressors includes some of the variables used also in the previous
estimations (i.e. ”family size”, ”education” and the dummies relative to the
job of the interviewed and of the place where he lives) and some diﬀerent ones.
The composition of the sample in particular, required to introduce a set of
dummies relative to the non-professional status of the individuals(”retired”,
”unemployed”, ”student”).
Additional informations reported in the survey are also used, i.e. those
relative to the fact that the respondent is the one that mostly contributes to
household income (dummy ”breadwinner”), that is responsible for family ex-
penses (dummy ”expenses”), and those relative to the presence of children living
with her (dummy ”children”). A further variable describes the size of the town
where people live, ranging from value 1 for those living in towns with up to
30000 inhabitants, to value 3 for those living in towns with more than 100.000
inhabitants.
Finally since informations on personal income were available, a further vari-
able, named ”incomeclass”, has been included; individuals are classiﬁed along
the scale reported below:
0) no income;
1) less than 516 euro;
2) from 516 to 775 euro;
3) from 775 to 1033 euro;
4) from 1033 to 1549 euro;
5) from 1549 to 2066 euro;
6) more than 2066 euro.
The table that follows reports the main result of the estimation.
36Table 4: Preference over employment protection.
Also in this case, the variable ”education” is statistically signiﬁcant for a 5%
conﬁdence interval and has a negative eﬀect on the probability that an individual
prefers a rigid labor market, as it is predicted by the theoretical model. In other
words more educated people choose the scenario where it is easy to get a job but
it is also easy to lose it; workers with lower degree of education prefer instead,
a labor market where there is high employment protection.
The variable age is not statistically signiﬁcant; the insider/outsider status
of the respondents prevails over this aspect. It is the case indeed, that the
variable unemployed has some statistical relevance (in particular is signiﬁcant
for an interval of conﬁdence of 5%) and a negative impact on the preference for
a rigid labor market.
Also the localization in southern Italy of the interviewed person has a sizeable
eﬀect over the probability that she prefers a rigid labor market.
It may be the case then, that the variable unemployment represents the pref-
erences of young outsiders for less employment protection. The variable south
on the other hand, may capture the eﬀects of the endemic unemployment in the
area hitting mainly low productivity workers; these individuals and especially
the old ones that are less likely to move to other places to ﬁnd a job, prefer in
facts more protection.
37In this sense the outcomes of the analysis can be brought back to the model
predictions and signal the existence of a mounting consensus toward a ﬂexibi-
lization of the labor market, shared by young outsiders and high productivity
insiders.
The empirical evidence then, seems to support the hypothesis that from the
initial support to a setup with early retirement and high employment protec-
tion, social preferences are shifting to a system with late retirement and low
employment protection; this change is lead by the same groups singled out in
the model, i.e. high productivity workers and young.
6F i n a l R e m a r k s
Present analysis is intended to contribute to current debate on Social Security
System reforms by stressing the mutual interdependence between labor market
and pension system; the crucial element in particular, is total turnover between
diﬀerent generations of workers.
Young agents indeed, want to ease their entry in the labor market either
by decreasing employment protection or by reducing the mandatory retirement
age; both choice are costly for them either in terms of present and future risk,
specially in case they reveal to be low productivity type, or in terms of taxation.
Old agents instead are mainly concerned by the reduction of current income
variability and they choose diﬀerent tools to cope with that depending on their
type.
High productivity old workers, use employment protection and retirement
against the risk of displacement; low productivity types on the other hand face
also an unemployment risk and thus must dispose of the same instruments to
reduce the eﬀects of both these events.
Agents preferences are mainly driven by the size of the productivity gap
existing between diﬀerent workers types; as a consequence two main setups
result from the political process.
The ﬁrst of them entails high employment protection and early retirement
and is sustained by the social groups of the young and of low productivity old
workers.
The second setup instead, includes low employment protection and late re-
tirement; it emerges in the political process when young and high productivity
old workers form a coalition.
This prediction ﬁnds a partial conﬁrm in the empirical evidence; the sur-
veys conducted in Italy and Germany reveal that the waves of reforms that
are changing the setups of the Social Security Systems in these countries are
backed by the consensus of the social groups indicated in the model. Indeed the
shift from high levels of employment protection and low mandatory retirement
age to lower protection and later retirement that took place during the 90’s is
particularly supported by the young and by highly educated people.
In this framework then, reforms that modify the setup of the Social Security
System require in order to be successful to provide a wide spectrum change that
38includes in the same picture both the pension system and the labor market; in
this way indeed it is possible to calibrate the generational turnover to a level
that gathers enough consensus among the diﬀerent groups of the economy.
7 Appendix: Representative Firm Preference for
High Productivity Workers
This section is aimed to justify in a formal framework, the assumption of a
representative ﬁrm preference for high productivity workers.
Consider a setup where hiring a high productivity workers causes a reduction
in production costs; this may be the case for instance because they allow to use
more eﬃcient routines or because they learn faster how to do their job.
Deﬁne representative ﬁrm proﬁts as follows:
Π = Y − WLP · LP − WHP · HP + i · HP
where the parameter i describes the decrease in costs generated by each HP
worker.
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so that when the wage for high productivity workers is set at W
¯
HP labor
demand never exceeds the number of these workers in the unemployment pool5.
As a consequence when old agents are still working, labor market faces always
excess supply; each unit of eﬃcient labor provided by HP and LP workers then,
is paid in the same way (W
¯
LP) and hiring high productivity individuals is always
beneﬁcial due to the reduction in costs that they can guarantee.
This justiﬁes ﬁrm preferences when displacement and selection take place.
Ad i ﬀerent issue is the decision at time when old agents retire since labor
market faces a supply shrink that causes an excess demand for high productivity
workers.
The representative ﬁrm then must decide wether or not to hire LP workers
and in case it does how many of them to get from the market.
Hiring low productivity workers is beneﬁcial both because it increases overall
production and because reduces HP workers marginal productivity; since labor
market is competitive indeed, when demand exceeds supply, high productivity
workers wage must be equal to their marginal productivity.
On the other hand each LP agent employed diminishes future proﬁts since
limits the possibility to exploit the reduction in costs deriving from HP workers
5Notice indeed, that even if all old high productivity workers are employed at time 0,s o
that half of them are displaced and cannot be hired immediately, labor demand does not
exceed 3
4 · a i.e. the number of HP workers that are either already in the ﬁrm or in the
unemployment pool.
39up until the selection process (at least for those individuals that are not hit by
the displacement process).
Suppose now that when retirement age is set at θ =1 , old individuals do not
work until they die but there is a period of length ε where the old generation
exits from the labor market; the hiring decision of the ﬁrm after retirement in
this way, is not equivalent to that taken after displacement.
Given that it is possible to show that if i is small enough, the representative
ﬁrm chooses to hire all the low productivity workers when the old generation
retires.
In order to simplify the analysis, a ”worst case scenario” is considered where
LP individuals employed at the beginning of the period, work in the represen-
tative ﬁrm until they retire at the mandatory age θ =1 ;t h i si se q u i v a l e n tt o
say that there is no displacement and that no selection take place at half of
the period. In other words at time 0,t h eﬁrm adjusts the level of labor input
derived from the previous period and maintains the same labor force (in terms
of size and composition) until retirement.
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¤1−α · LP −
α · a
£1
2 (a +1 )
¤1−α · HP + i · HP
)
Notice that the initial level of labor input is set at 1
2 ·a since all high produc-
tivity workers are hired after retirement; this implies further that maximization
problem can be treated as a static one
Consider the ﬁrst order conditions for the maximization problem and start















































Notice now that from the ﬁrst equation, it is the case that:
40α
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Consider now which are the conditions to have a complete turnover when












· i ≥ 0
Notice that as i approaches zero the above condition is always true; more-
over since this result holds when no substitution of LP workers is possible and
retirement age is set at the maximum, it must hold a fortiori when instead, dis-
placement and selection allow the replacement of low productivity individuals
with high productivity ones and θ<1.
The original setting then, can be thought as an approximation for the model
introduced above where the beneﬁt associated to the hiring of HP workers is
very small (in the limit null) and the period in which old individuals quit working
without retiring is negligible.
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